‘THE BLOODY TRIANGLE: RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KAZAKH CRISIS’
Analysis by Thys Millan
The recent protests and violence in Kazakhstan have captivated world attention for the last few weeks and have been mired in controversy since their very inception, not least of all because of their suddenness and lack of perceived coordination. Russian media outlets have maintained that the crisis is part of a Western-funded plot to stage a “color revolution” in Kazakhstan, a stance similarly held by Kazakh President Qasym-Jomart Toqaev in his own statements (Walker, 2022). The United States and Western Europe, on the other hand, have surmised that the whole thing is actually a Russian operation designed to give Russia more leverage in the region (Harned 2022), particularly in the wake of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) deployment of peacekeepers that include Russian military units.
Yet the CSTO has now withdrawn those troops, and Toqaev has taken a softer approach towards those involved in the protests – whereas he previously had taken a bellicose attitude towards them and issued shoot-to-kill orders for the Kazakh military (Vaal 2022). This seems, in the context of previous events – particularly those in Ukraine in the last decade and Belarus in the last two years – to be an odd resolution. Considering the trend in Russian foreign policy that, according to many Western analysts, shows revanchist tendencies and an iron will to keep neighboring countries under the thumb of the Kremlin, the Russian government appears to have missed a clear opportunity to further that agenda. I would argue, however, that they have not missed anything. On the contrary, the apparent freedom that the Kazakh government now has is a temporary, strategic risk that has been taken by Russia to shore up its international prestige and perceived power while readying themselves for a new stage of the Ukrainian border crisis that has been brewing for the past few months.
A New Wild Card
Prior to the events of this January, Kazakhstan was widely considered one of the most stable nations in Central Asia despite the obvious autocracy of Nazarbaev, even by commentators in the West. Now, however, the political future of the nation remains open-ended. Much of the protesting that occurred was not strictly directed at the Toqaev administration’s decision to lift fuel price caps – which was the initial catalyst for the protests (Tojken 2022) – but also at the Nazarbaev “clan” who are perceived to still control much of the political system (Hopkins and Nechepurenko, 2022). In the wake of these expressions of discontent, Toqaev has attempted to distance himself from the politics of the former autarch, lashing out publicly at his family members and introducing new political and economic reforms despite himself having been hand-picked by Nazarbaev for the presidency (Putz 2022; Vaal 2022). In addition, the outright armed rebellion that occurred in some areas of the country has, according to some reports, been linked to Islamist movements that operate clandestinely in the country (MFA Kazakhstan, 2022). These developments have clouded prospects for political reconciliation in the country and may perhaps set the stage for more conflict in the coming year.
Given that Kazakhstan is the only country that borders Russia in Central Asia, and has always been friendly with the Kremlin, there is no doubt that the level of unrest startled Russian strategists and politicians. It certainly would have snapped them out of the same ‘peaceful autocracy’ reverie that plagued Western policy and thinking about the nation. To their credit, the Russian government’s immediate and continuing response to the upheavals next-door have firmly dispelled the notion that they are behind the situation. By all accounts, it appears that they were just as surprised by its outbreak and ferocity as Western Europe or the United States were (TASS 2022).
The Triangle
Russian foreign policy is now burdened, on its own terms, by the events not only in Kazakhstan, but in Ukraine. The now eight-year-long crisis and civil war that has been occurring in the latter nation is intimately tied to Russia, given that the insurgents in Donetsk and Luhansk have openly asked for annexation and that the Russian government has provided them with arms and ammunition. More recently, nearly a hundred thousand troops have been amassed at the Ukrainian-Russian border in what the United States and Western Europe have deemed preparation for an invasion of Ukraine. Russian government officials have the stated goal of deterring the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Ukraine, which Western states have pushed back against (Schifrin and Sagalyn, 2022; Al Jazeera, 2022).
Suddenly, just as the Kremlin begins to put more pressure on the West with all its troops in place, Kazakhstan nearly turns into a warzone of its own accord. In the aftermath of this sudden development, the Russian government has been pushed, quite neatly, between a rock and a hard place: which neighbor does it want to worry about? Ukraine, which has been a thorn in its side for nearly a decade, and in which it is already embroiled? Or Kazakhstan, which has demonstrated the existence of a huge hidden fault line in explosive fashion, destabilizing what was once considered the most stable nation in Central Asia?
With the decision of the Russian-led CSTO to pull peacekeepers out of Kazakhstan and statements made by the government indicating that Kazakhstan must now forge its own path, it has become clear what Putin’s priorities are on the international stage. Despite its newfound instability, and despite the prospects of Toqaev being replaced during some future period of civil unrest with a pro-European or even Islamist leader, it appears that Kazakhstan is of only secondary importance compared to Ukraine. This has been further reinforced with a renewed Russian push for their objectives in the latter nation coinciding with the withdrawal of troops from the former. The Russian government has gained some international prestige from this withdrawal – sending and taking back peacekeeping forces in a manner like that of the West, raising the international profile of Russia and humiliating Western analysts who claimed Russian military units would simply plant themselves in Kazakhstan, never to return (Vakil 2022). More importantly, however, it has gained the ability to unify its forces, and to concentrate all its energy on a single target: the Donbas.
In addition, the case for directing Russian attention mainly to Ukraines has an element of necessity to it beyond the unrest that both nations have experienced. As stated earlier, the political fate of Kazakhstan has restabilized, if only for the moment, but is now uncertain in the long run. On the other hand, Ukraine is the polar opposite. If the Russian government does not focus its resources on that country, it will assuredly face the pro-Western, anti-Russian Zelensky administration as a reinforced entity. The United States and the European Union will take any opportunity to increase their support for Ukraine, and a lapse in Russian concentration would give them that chance. This is a situation that is untenable within the current foreign policy of Russia, and is therefore considered absolutely unacceptable by the Kremlin.
Does that mean that Kazakhstan has now been passed over by Russia on the international stage? Absolutely not. Judging by Russian reactions to the civil unrest in Kazakhstan when it occurred, the country is still near the top of the Kremlin’s watchlist. It would severely disrupt Russian policy in Central Asia if Toqaev were to turn on Putin or be ousted by some rival government, and Russia cannot afford yet another highly unstable (and unpredictable) neighbor. There is little doubt that Kazakhstan will be observed very closely, and that the Russian government will attempt to rein in whatever further unrest may occur there – it’s not a matter of not if, but when this unrest will occur.
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Russian troops deployed to Kazakhstan as peacekeepers board a flight home. Photo by: Gavriil Grigorov, TASS