STRATEGIC INFLUENCE: RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS BELARUS
Analysis by Thys Millan
The last two years have seen Belarus—a nation that, up until recently, rarely graced the headlines of international newspapers in the three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union—stride abruptly into the spotlight. Its controversial presidential election of 2020, the resulting protests, and a recent border crisis with the European Union have brought Belarus much attention on the world stage, some well-received and some not well-received, though mostly the latter. Given this suddenly volatile situation, the assumption that Russia, Belarus’ largest neighbor, would want nothing to do with it seems perfectly logical at face value. And yet, the Russian government’s interest in Belarus has only increased in this period, as has its support for the erstwhile Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko.
Large joint military exercises, promises of integration, and vocal support from Russian president Vladimir Putin have both worried and somewhat mystified international observers. The nature of this turn of events, however, can be concisely clarified. Renewed Russian interest in Belarus stems from three foreign policy needs: firstly, to prevent the further expansion of NATO, the European Union, and more broadly “Western” political values; secondly, to provide Russia with a foothold closer to Central Europe with which to broaden the scope of its international involvement; and thirdly, to ensure that the political situation of the country remains stable and amenable to Russian interests.
The New Iron Curtain
In the last half of the twentieth century, the tendency of Russia—as then the Soviet Union—to establish “satellite states” is well recorded. These states were nominally independent but were heavily influenced by the decisions of the Kremlin, ideologically and geopolitically speaking. They were set up overall in response to perceived threats to Soviet/Russian political autonomy and goals, these threats usually taking the form of expanding Western political or military influence (Kramer, 2009). Such satellites ensured “breathing room” for the Soviet Union, preventing Western political and military operations close to Soviet borders and ensuring stability in relations between the Soviets and their immediate neighbors.
When Russian President Putin took power for the first time in 2000, a regressive shift towards those same foreign policy prospects began. Putin’s political standpoints and those of his party, United Russia, were and are very conservative, nationalist, and in some aspects revanchist, all of which are popular ideas in Russia (Michel, 2015). This has frightened neighboring states of Russia, who view them as an indirect attack on their political and cultural sovereignty and have sought out Western aid and advice in preparation for a predicted overbearing Russian influence (Moga & Alexeev, 2013). Western Europe, however, is less concerned with Russian political demographics on their own—no matter how illiberal they may be perceived—but rather with the threat of Russian encroachment on nations friendly to the European Union, leading to a reciprocation of Central and Eastern Europe’s requests for aid (Moga &s Alexeev, 2013; Mattelaer & Vansina, 2020).
Regarding Belarus, the protests that followed the presidential election of 2020 with their large presence and distinctly Western-oriented program convinced the Russian government that it was very possible for a more pro-European, unfriendly government to be installed in Minsk (Simmons, 2021), likely resulting in increased Western presence and pressure directly next to Russia herself. This was obviously a metaphorical “red line” (Mattelaer & Vansina, 2020) and the Kremlin moved immediately to consolidate ties with and support for the government of Lukashenko to prevent it from being crossed, a move that has been successful thus far. Their push to integrate the two countries, beginning in 1999 with the creation of the “Union State” but engaged most recently with the signing of protocols for unification in various economic fields last year (TASS 2021) has served to shore up these ties as a “backstop” for a new status quo.
Recent Russian dealings with Belarus are not all conducted out of worry, however; there is also an opportunist sentiment that stems from overall Russian policy on Europe. Belarus is conveniently situated next to Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania—all formerly within the Soviet sphere of influence and all generally hostile to Russia, especially in the wake of the Donbass conflict and the more recent Russian troop build-up on the Ukrainian border (Karmanau, 2021). Closer ties with Belarus allow Russia to project influence onto the former’s other three neighbors, namely in the form of hard power, which has been demonstrated in the massive Zapad 2021 military exercises conducted between the Belarusian and Russian armed forces in apparent preparation for a NATO attack (Coes, 2021).
Lassoing an Unruly Neighbor
The relationship between Russia and Belarus has not always been as close as it is now, and is still variable to a certain extent. Lukashenko has frequently tried to gain concessions from both Russia and Western Europe, and his overtures toward the latter have often been conducted alongside chastising of the former. This has come in many forms, notably refusal to recognize Russian control of Crimea or claiming that the Kremlin was attempting to rig the Belarusian presidential election using the mercenary Wagner group (Coes, 2021; Radio Liberty, 2020). In addition, the humanitarian crisis on the Belarus-Poland border has resulted in diplomatic uproar while Lukashenko refuses to conduct himself according to Western standards until European sanctions, applied after the Belarusian protests of 2020, are lifted (Troianovski, Pronczuk, & Magdziarz, 2021). Some European nations, notably Poland, blame Russia for “masterminding” the crisis (BBC, 2021)—an unlikely scenario, given the uncomfortable position in which it puts the Russian government.
While counterintuitive, this has likely increased the drive to integrate with Belarus. Being now hounded by the West as a pariah state, Lukashenko’s only option is to turn to Russia for political and economic support, placing the very leverage that the Kremlin needs to prevent his own elastic international dalliances at their feet (Coes, 2021). Putin is now positioned perfectly to pressure the Belarusian government for concessions, not only in terms of physical gains like military bases but also to force Lukashenko to hew closer to Russian foreign policy (Coes, 2021). Economic integration, given the disproportion between the Russian and Belarusian economies and the existing reliance of Belarus’s economy on Russia (Rumer & Belei, 2017), will solidify this leverage and slowly force Belarus “into line.”
Toward a More Perfect Union
The result of these foreign policy designs on the part of Russia is a slow-burning victory in the long term. The Kremlin is now able to better secure the country from Western European influence and perceived incursions, military or otherwise; it has provided itself with a space to project its own political and military power as a counterweight to that of NATO and the European Union; and it has primed its own relationship with Belarus to push Lukashenko’s political designs closer to those of Russia and [further] away from the West. Not all these goals have been achieved or will be in the immediate future—it may be some years after this point when we see further dramatic effects, particularly regarding the Russo-Belarusian “Union State.”
Opportunities for further concessions from Belarus to the benefit of Russian foreign policy are now mainly confined in the realm of political and economic integration. If Western sanctions continue against Belarus, the Russian government will likely be able to gain concessions on more economic interdependence—which realistically will be more like disproportionate dependence of Belarus on Russia—and will corner Lukashenko into a place where he cannot pursue foreign (or domestic) policy that clashes with that of Putin. Somewhat less likely, but still a vague probability, is a future where the Kremlin may force the end of Lukashenko’s regime to placate the West and opposition movements within Belarus, replacing him with a political figure as bland as they would be completely amenable to Russian interests. This, of course, is conjecture, but the open-endedness of this situation stands: the Russian government now has that of Belarus in its hands, but it remains to be seen what the eventual result will be if—or when—it squeezes.
Bibliography
BBC (2021, November 9). Belarus migrants: Poland PM blames Russia's Putin for migrant crisis. British Broadcasting Corporation. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59226226
Coes, P. (2021, October 8). Examining Belarus’ Growing Reliance on Russia. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/10/examining-belarus-growing-reliance-on-russia/
Karmanau, Y. (2021, December 20). Poland, Lithuania back Ukraine, urge Russia sanctions. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/poland-lithuania-back-ukraine-urge-russia-sanctions-81857785
Kramer, M. (2009). Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944–53. In V. Tismaneanu (Ed.), Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe (NED-New edition, 1, pp. 51–102). Central European University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctt1281tc.6
Mattelaer, A., & Vansina, L. (Eds.). (2020). Understanding Russian foreign policy. In Dealing with Russia: Towards a Coherent Belgian Policy (pp. 6–10). Egmont Institute. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28848.5
Michel, C. (2015). Pew Survey: Irredentism Alive and Well in Russia. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/pew-survey-irredentism-alive-and-well-in-russia/
Moga, T. and Alexeev, D. (2013). Post-Soviet States Between Russia and the EU: Reviving Geopolitical Competition? A Dual Perspective. Connections, 13(1), pp. 41-52. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326349
Radio Liberty (2020, August 1). Belarusian President Accuses Russia of Trying To Cover Up Vagner Group Election Plot. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-diplomats-meet-detained-vagner-contractors-in-minsk-jail/30761549.html
Rumer, E. and Belei, B. (2017). Belarus: With Friends Like These[…]. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Rumer_Belarus.pdf
Simmons, A. (2021, August 12). Belarus’ Lukashenko Tightens His Grip a Year After Disputed Election. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/belaruss-lukashenko-tightens-his-grip-a-year-after-disputed-election-11628441325
TASS (2021, December 13). Russia-Belarus integration to get deeper, two sovereign states to remain — Lukashenko. Russian News Agency TASS. https://tass.com/world/1374895
Troianovski, A., Pronczuk, M. and Magdziarz, A. (2021, November 9). West Accuses Belarus of Orchestrating Migrant Crisis at Polish Border. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/09/world/europe/poland-belarus-border-crisis.html