RUSSIAN WHIRLWIND: THE WAGNER REBELLION AND ITS EFFECTS
September 2023
On June 23, 2023, the most sweeping piece of Russian political theatre since Yeltsin’s coup in 1993 began with a tremendous bang. The main characters were the same as those who have been involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the past year and a half, and whose names will already be familiar to even a Western audience: Putin, Prigozhin, Kadyrov, Shoigu, Gerasimov, Lukashenko. Though this drama lasted only the course of 24 hours it shook not only the political establishment in Russia but also Western observers; the suddenness of these events coupled with the notorious, almost hermetic secrecy of the Russian state regarding domestic matters has resulted in much speculation. Some have largely ignored it as irrelevant or only a small part of a larger domestic fracturing that has been occurring for some time, while others have overblown its significance to the point of fantasy (Aydıntaşbaş et. al., 2023; Rosenberg, 2023). The reality – predictably, yet somewhat uninterestingly - seems to lie in-between these two conclusive extremes, yet its effects open a whole new world of possibilities for the Russian people and for Western nations looking to gain insight into Russia’s conduct both domestically and in terms of foreign affairs.
The timeline of events, while there are still some elements left up to interpretation, is largely known. In the evening of June 23, Yevgenii Prigozhin – head of the private military company ‘Wagner’ – released a video excoriating the regular Russian high command. He focused especially on Sergei Shoigu and Valerii Gerasimov, with whom he had a longstanding feud. According to him, Wagner troops had been fired upon by their own side, and that this was the last straw for the mercenary company. That same evening, Wagner forces left their posts on the frontlines of Ukraine, where they had been instrumental in Russia’s capture of the city of Bakhmut. Instead of advancing, they turned around, and by the next morning had marched back across the Russian border and taken Rostov-on-Don with little to no resistance from regular military forces there. Shoigu, who had been in the city to coordinate Russian military efforts, disappeared and was assumed to have gone into hiding. Prigozhin began releasing statements calling this a ‘March of Justice’; thousands-strong columns of Wagner troops began advancing northwards (Robertson, 2023). Ramzan Kadyrov condemned the ‘March,’ and a group of Chechen militants were sent to try and crush the Wagner rebellion. Russian President Vladimir Putin made a televised speech describing these events as ‘an armed mutiny’ and ‘treason’ just after it was announced that Voronezh had also been captured – again with little resistance – by Wagner troops. The presidential plane was recorded as taking off from Moscow and then disappearing from radar; Putin too had presumably fled to safety (Kirby, 2023; Rosenberg, 2023).
Rosgvardia (the Russian National Guard) was called upon by the mayor of Moscow to set up defensive works around the city, which was the obvious eventual target of the Wagner columns as they marched past Voronezh and further north. Haphazard roadblocks were constructed along major highways by local police and civilian forces loyal to Putin (The Moscow Times, 2023). Strangely, while there were initial reports of ‘Wagnerites’ engaging in skirmishes with Kadyrov’s Chechen column, they have not been confirmed, and after a certain point the Chechens vanish from the stage with no explanation. Hours passed, updates reported were minute-by-minute, and eventually Wagner troops were sighted entering the southernmost borders of Moscow Oblast, only 100km away from the capital. As they closed within 50 kilometers of their destination, a surprise announcement was made. Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko declared that he had succeeded in brokering a deal between Prigozhin and Putin, and that the ‘March’ was to be called off. Prigozhin, after about an hour, confirmed this development over social media. In exchange for clemency from the Russian government, he and those loyal to him were forced to leave for Belarus, while those ‘Wagnerites’ who did not would be signed up directly with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Prigozhin has since announced that Wagner will focus more on its operations in Africa and the Middle East (Kirby, 2023; Sky News, 2023).
These events have not changed the superstructure of the Russian state, to the disappointment of some Western observers – it was not, in the end, a coup – and similarly did not result in a drastic shake-up of Russian operations in Ukraine. It has, however, likely influenced the way the Russian government views its domestic issues and how the Russian people view this entire, extended conflict. For one, the ‘March of Justice’ began from within the existing Russian security structure – Prigozhin, who started his political career as Putin’s personal chef, has a long history of weaving his Wagner forces into the arsenal of the Russian high command – and sprung into existence with seemingly no Russian security service being prepared for it. The shambling defenses that were arranged around Moscow as well as Putin and Shoigu’s respective disappearing acts during the ‘March’ only add to this sense of unpreparedness, and point to a further conclusion: the Russian state apparatus was genuinely scared. It was intimidated into negotiations by a private army that it helped create; while Prigozhin’s motives examined after the fact seem to lean towards shifting the structure of the regular army in his favour as opposed to a full-blown coup, the odds favored a rebel victory in the event of one. In general, the strength of Russia’s government in controlling even its own side gave way spectacularly, and it has not yet fully recovered (Rosenberg, 2023).
While the deal made with Prigozhin saved face for the Russian government, averted what could have been a civil war, and allowed it to push aside a volatile asset, it also outlined exactly how poorly structured Russian defensive systems really are. It proved that even a column travelling out in the open can march straight up to the gates of Moscow with barely a scratch from the institutions that are supposed to prevent such an occurrence – probably because most of Russian military resources have been and still are focused on the renewed offensive by the Ukrainians. This tunnel vision will certainly be addressed in the coming months by the Russian government, but the resources they can put into its rectification are now more limited by the fragmentation of Wagner and subsequent re-adjustment of Russian forces on the Ukrainian front. In addition, it risks making itself unpopular with its citizens if it cannot remain stablev (Latypova, 2023). This combination of unpopularity and instability would be fatal; if pushed far enough in the long run, it could force a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine and a toppling of the current Russian government under Putin (Rondeaux, 2023).
For the moment, however, the prognosis for Putin and his administration is neutral: there are no more apparent domestic threats, the government has regained some of its popular standing, and the progress of the war in Ukraine has not swayed toward one side or the other in the months since June. While this stability is likely more of a façade than we realise, it is equally likely to last until a different drastic event unseats it and moves Russia one notch closer to a situation it hasn’t encountered for a very long time. What that event looks like will not only be up to the eye of the beholder, but the hands of its creator – and now is perhaps the time for somebody to step forward.
By Thys Millan
Citations
Aydıntaşbaş, A. et. al. (2023, June 27). What is the fallout of Russia’s Wagner rebellion? Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/ [Accessed 10 August 2023].
Kirby, P. (2023, June 24). Wagner chief’s 24 hours of chaos in Russia. BBC, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66006880 [Accessed 13 August 2023].
Moscow Times, The (2023, 26 June). Russian Regions Roll Back Security Measures After Wagner Rebellion. The Moscow Times, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/26/russian-regions-roll-back-security-measures-after-wagner-rebellion-a81635 [Accessed 18 August 2023].
Latypova, L. (2023, July 3). Wagner Mutiny Stirs Panic, Uncertainty and Hope for Change in Russia’s Ethnic Republics. The Moscow Times, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/30/russia-says-wagners-future-in-africa-depends-on-countries-concerned-a81706 [Accessed 14 August 2023].
Robertson, N. (2023, June 27). Why Prigozhin’s short-lived Russian rebellion failed. CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/26/europe/prigozhin-putin-wagner-rebellion-analysis-intl/index.html [Accessed 10 August 2023].
Rondeaux, C. (2023, June 26). What Led to Wagner’s Mutiny in Russia. Time, https://time.com/6290163/wagner-mutiny-russia/ [Accessed 11 August 2023].
Rosenberg, S. (2023, June 25). Russia: Instability ratchets up pressure on Vladimir Putin. BBC, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66015624 [Accessed 11 August 2023].
Sky News (2023, June 25). Wagner Group rebellion in Russia: How revolt led by ‘Putin’s Chef’ unfolded. Sky News, https://news.sky.com/story/wagner-group-rebellion-in-russia-how-revolt-led-by-putins-chef-unfolded-12909122 [Accessed 9 August 2023].
Photo: Yevgeny Prigozhin in a screen capture from his video address from Rostov-on-Don, Russia, on the 24th of June after it was captured by his mercenary troops. Source: Prigozhin Press Service, via Associated Press