RUSSIA IN WESTERN SAHARA: AN OASIS OF OPPORTUNITIES?
Analysis by Julia Antone
When thinking of Russian presence abroad, one seldom envisions North Africa as a key channel through which Russia develops its influence. Yet, over the past years, Moscow has been strengthening its hand in the region, slowly positioning itself as a counter force to American and Chinese influence. The Western Sahara crisis in particular seems to have piqued its interest, leading to closer diplomatic and trade relations with Algeria. Has Russian concern for the region revived from the ashes of the Cold War? If so, what does it stand to gain from renewed involvement in a place so far from home?
The Origins of the Western Sahara Conflict
Following Franco’s death in 1975, Spain ceded Western Sahara to Mauritania and Morocco as part of the Madrid Agreement (Glossary of the Moroccan Sahara Issue - Madrid Accords, 2022). Conducted at the highest level of negotiations, this deal effectively ignored the pleas of the region’s inhabitants (the Sahrawis) and their representatives (the Polisario Front) for an independent Western Sahara: the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic - SADR (Chograni, 2020). From the very start, Algiers stepped up as a staunch supporter of SADR indepence, leading to multiple clashes with Rabat. At the same time, the two states made efforts to avoid any major escalation, hence maintaining a fragile equilibrium preventing the outbreak of a full-scale armed conflict.
However, this fragile equilibrium was disturbed in December 2020, when President Donald Trump unilaterally recognised Western Sahara as part of Morocco, in exchange for a normalisation of relations between Morocco and Israel (Bolton, 2020). Naturally, this deeply upset Algeria, thus far convinced that the Western Sahara’s fate rested in the hands of the UN. Algiers was also wary of a Washington-Rabat-Tel-Aviv axis forming at its doorstep. Beyond ideological concerns, the alliance might, in the long-term, enable Rabat to replace Algiers as the N°1 military force in the region, hence considerably shifting the power dynamics in Maghreb (Allouche, 2021). Despite Algiers’ best hopes that Biden’s administration might have changed the course of events, the new president ultimately proved as keen as his predecessor to support Morocco, leaving both the Sahrawis and Algerians in the same conundrum as before.
Russian Interests
The Western Sahara conflict has thus far played to Russia’s advantage. Today, Algeria is the third-largest importer of arms from Moscow and it is its largest customer on the African continent. Roughly 70 percent of its military hardware originates from Russia (Jansen, 2021). Of course, the country’s need for armament is fuelled in no small part by the conflict: the weapons bought from Moscow are the very same ones that Algiers then re-sells to the Polisario Front (Jansen, 2021). With its supply of arms to Algeria, Moscow sustains a strategic position that enables it to place itself in a role similar to that of the US with Morocco, being both a trade partner and an ally. However, its role is much more subtle than that of Washington’s. By offering only indirect support to Algeria (rather than openly standing behind Algiers’ interests; as in the case of the US with Morocco), it makes friends without considerably irking others (namely Rabat). The Trump administration's diplomatic gaffe also played to its advantage. By acknowledging Moroccan sovereignty without the UN, the US reinforced its reputation as a unilateral and unreliable player (Tharoor, 2020) in situations that otherwise require delicate, and multilateral, diplomatic manoeuvring. This strengthened Russia’s narrative as a power which, on the other hand, is capable of working with others as a cautious and pragmatic figure in times of crisis.
The conflict has also benefited Moscow on the economic front. The defence industry is a strategically important sector and one that counts as a large employer in the country. Hence, the sale of arms to Algeria has proven useful in the bid to sustain the industry’s development (Middle East Monitor, 2021), especially in light of American sanctions.
Finally, Moscow’s close ties with Algeria warrant it an easy access to the Mediterranean, thereby allowing it to project its military power in the Mediterranean sea more efficiently. Whilst its naval presence there remains extremely limited, this exclusive access gets it one step closer to countering NATO presence in the region (Sokolsky and Rumer, 2021). It comes in addition to its naval base in Syria and enables it to apply yet a little more pressure on NATO.
A Progressive Approach
Clearly, Russia has an economic and strategic interest in the conflict. But to what extent is it willing to engage with it? To truly understand Russia’s position, one must first understand the context in which it operates.
The Arab Spring had dramatically shook Russian engagement with North Africa. Officially, Moscow remained cautious in its stance towards the new governments of the region and demonstrated its support for the status quo. Its views illustrate its rejection of the perceived Western desire to support regime change (Facon, 2017). This attitude is still perceivable today in its relation to the Sahara crisis. Russian arms trade with Algeria does not imply full fledged military support for the Polisario - unlike in Syria, Moscow is unlikely to send military aid anytime soon. Furthermore, although its actions clearly betray its support for Algiers, Moscow has refrained from antagonising Morocco in its rhetoric. Traditionally, Russia has involved itself most intensely in its “immediate neighbourhood” and the case of Western Sahara does not fall within this realm.
On the whole, the Western Sahara crisis has clearly provided Russia with a channel for developing its influence in Maghreb. Whilst it is exploiting the opportunity to establish itself as a regional player, one must not be too hasty in judging the intensity with which it is doing so. The region does not yet represent a top foreign policy objective, and Russia is still advancing its interests in a gradual and prudent fashion. Far from being uninterested in the region, the Kremlin has just decided to adopt a progressive approach in its dealings so far from home.
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Main page picture: a bulldozer passes by a hilltop manned by Moroccan soldiers on a road between Mauritania and Morocco in Guerguerat located in the Western Sahara, November 23 2020. Photo by: AFP Photo
Peacekeepers have been stationed in Western Sahara since 1991 when the UN mission, MINURSO, was established. Photo by: Martine Perret UN Photo