MACRON’S “THIRD-WAY”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sparked global outrage, prompting a number of international actors (notably Western countries) to condemn the Kremlin’s actions.

Interestingly however, the outcry was not altogether unanimous and equal in scope. In particular, France stood out as one of the only European countries that has maintained dialogue with President Putin since the conflict broke out (Reure, 2022). French president Emmanuel Macron went as far as positioning himself as the unofficial mediator in the crisis, multiplying trips and phone calls between Kiev, Moscow, Brussels and Washington (Caulcutt, 2022). 

Although his initiative surprised many, it actually inscribed itself within the continuum of what can be termed Macron’s “third way”: an attempt to differentiate French foreign policy from US interests without altogether neglecting the traditional Western stance (The Economist, 2019).

The “Macron turn”

When Macron came to power in 2017, he made a decisive effort to carve out a new, more prominent place for France on the international stage. Part of this effort was about rekindling with Russia after years of tension, in particular following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow’s involvement alongside Damascus in the Syrian conflict (Semo, 2017). 

With this, Macron sought to differentiate himself from his predecessors, Francois Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy, who had opted for a “neoconservative foreign policy”. Their FP placed emphasis on the protection of human rights in France’s dealings with other countries, and the so-called right of intervention when foreign governments flout those rights (which corresponded with a closer relationship with the US and Western military alliances such as NATO) (Zaretsky, 2019). 

Macron’s approach is not altogether unique however, and can be traced back to French president Charles de Gaulle, famously known for calling for closer ties with the USSR and pulling France out of NATO’s integrated military command in 1967 (Trachtenberg, 2002). De Gaulle’s strategy focussed on three irreducible values: sovereignty, independence, and strategic autonomy (Zaretsky, 2019). 

In his attempts to draw closer to Russia, Macron has clearly taken inspiration from this approach, although he has also fallen short of going “full de Gaulle”. On the one hand, France has proven more keen than its Western allies to maintain and expand political, economic and cultural dialogue with Russia, since it perceives nurturing this relationship as a way to channel a “sovereign, independent and autonomous” FP. On the other hand, it remains committed to defending its security, European and transatlantic solidarity, as well as democratic and liberal values, which it believes indissociable from Western alliances (such as NATO) (Kastoueva-Jean, 2019). 

Hence, the “third way”: not 100% pro-Atlantic, but certainly not 100% negligent of the traditional Western stance either. 

Macron on the Ukraine question

The “third way” has of course been most evident with the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine: although France imposed sanctions on Russia and added it to its list of “non-friendly countries”, Macron stood out for his willingness to engage in a dialogue with Putin and act as a mediator in the war (Caulcutt, 2022).

However, this strategy is not without its fair share of paradoxes. To begin with, Macron’s attempt to work as “a neutral arbitrator” in the conflict was hampered from the very beginning by the French president’s commitments to the Minsk II Agreement. Of particular importance were the points that focused on Ukraine constitutionally decentralising and opening talks with the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (Reuters, 2021).

It was the failure to implement Minsk II which led to greater protestation by the Moscow government to redress perceived systemic security imbalance with NATO aligned forces regarding Ukraine. In December of 2022, the Russian foreign ministry sent a letter of ultimatum in which it outlined a set of security guarantees that it wished the West to concede upon including a ban on Ukraine entering NATO (Roth, 2021).

In the beginning of February 2022, Macron travelled to Moscow to discuss with the President of Russia about the buildup of troops along the Ukrainian borders. With hindsight, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the talks were a moot point or if negotiations could have averted armed conflict. From reports it was said that Macron and Putin had been able to find “points of convergence” (Mackintosh et al., 2022).

This renewed dialogue with Moscow was prompted by assertions made by the United States State department that Russia was planning a false flag attack against itself (Kelemen, 2022). In the wake of these announcements also came Russian troop movements towards the border with Ukraine in further display of Moscow's determination to back up its ultimatums with force. 

When discussing the points at which Macron’s and Putin's interests could not align is the situation in which the Russian government's continued insistence on the implementation of Minsk II. Among many of the issues raised was the Russian government's assertion that Ukraine was mistreating the Russian speakers within Ukraine. It is important to mention that Russia was not a signatory to Minsk II and rather the issue was whether or not Ukraine would directly negotiate with the separatist regions of the Donbass. This was something which the Ukrainian government did not address (Andreas, 2023).

This is again where Macron's “third way” ran into several irreconciliable issues with his Western allies. In particular the unwillingness on the part of countries like the United States and Germany to support substantial portions of Minsk II. Many in Ukraine also felt that Minsk 2 (although they had already agreed to it) gave too much power to the Russians and was signed in under duress (Walker 2022).

Former Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel goes as far to imply that the West was not acting in good faith and instead was using Minsk II to “Buy Ukraine Time”(Newsroom 2022). A third position on diplomacy implies that there is at least the possibility of giving concessions to one side or the other. If Macron was not in agreement with Merkel on Minsk II essentially being a stop gap measure, then he was in fact possibly the only one of the group willing to try to implement Minsk II over against his own allies and the Russians who no longer felt the need to abide by an agreement that its western interlocutors were not honouring. 

Conclusion

Despite Macron's desire to, French foreign policy struggles to be truly independent because it has non negotiable security arrangements that it cannot easily renege on with other Western partners. For Instance France’s obligation to NATO means that it cannot easily break from US and NATO military goals when it comes to the war in Ukraine. 

Though Macron recognizes that the breakdown of the implementation of the Minsk accords was the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, he was not and is not in a position to do anything about it. Unilaterally fixing Minsk as a starting point does not work because it presupposes a level of diplomatic interdependency that Macron's strategy of diplomatic independence does not support. If Russian issues over the failure of Minsk are going to be addressed it will have to come from the joint western world and will not be achieved by just one world leader acting alone. 

France’s attempt at an independent foreign policy initially gave Macron legitimacy and prestige domestically. However as the war continues and Macron's posturing is increasingly seen as ineffective, this feigned independence comes off as more embarrassing than glorious. The future of the conflict remains uncertain but what observers can be reasonably certain of is that France is unlikely to independently solve the issue. 

By Matthew Bryant & Julia Antone 

Bibliography

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Image: Alongside French President Emmanuel Macron, Russian President Vladimir Putin waves upon his arrival at the Versailles Palace on Monday. Photo: Stephane De Sakutin/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

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