HUNGARY’S FRIENDSHIP WITH RUSSIA: A VISEGRÁD GROUP PERSPECTIVE
Analysis by Zsofi Szelpal
In November 2021, Péter Szijjártó proudly accepted the Order of Friendship awarded by Sergei Lavrov, the Russian counterpart of the Hungarian foreign minister (Hungary Today, 2021). Both sides have repeatedly confirmed trust and national interest as the basis of the relationship, mutually benefitting the self-proclaimed superpower and the Central European country still struggling to accept its smallness (Szalai, 2017). So what’s the issue with fostering a drama-free, seemingly rational friendship?
Background of V4
The four Central Eastern European countries that make up the Visegrád Group (V4) - Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary - share many things in common: geographic and some cultural proximity (Gajda, 2014), similar paths of economic transition after socialism, and accession to the European Union in 2004. A big part of the shared experience rests on their emotionally-charged historical relationship with Russia, which can be labelled anything but drama-free. Hungary and Czechoslovakia revolted in 1956 and 1968 respectively, while Poland’s oppression goes back much longer and was lastly embodied by the Solidarity movement of the 1980s. All of these factors create favourable conditions for cooperation and coordination, not just on the EU level, but also with regards to Russia. The reality is, however, that avoiding discussing Russia is the last string keeping the V4 together.
The Visegrád Group was formed in 1991 for the purposes of coordinating policy preferences on the EU level and facilitating business and cultural exchange between the members. Plans for military cooperation have been made but remain unrealised due to the highly divergent geopolitical interests, concerns, and capabilities of the states (Laffitte, 2021), also responsible for their different positions on Russia. The main outlier is Poland: disproportionately bigger than the other members, it shares a border with Russia and sees it as an “existential threat”. Leonard and Popescu (2007) characterise Poland as a ‘warrior’ within the EU, demonstrating an “overtly hostile” position towards the massive neighbour. Furthermore, as the brains behind the Eastern Opening Policy (along with Sweden), the country actively aims to reduce Russia’s sphere of influence around and beyond its borders. In contrast, the smaller members are pragmatists as they are highly reliant on Russian energy, and the population’s majority does not see Russia posing danger to their countries (Milo, 2021). However, Hungarian pragmatism is seeing unprecedented, increasing intensity that may endanger the unity of the Visegrád Group, and even the European Union according to the most pessimistic forecasts.
“Eastern Winds are Blowing”
Politicians and scholars alike understand foreign policy pragmatism as placing national interest above all other considerations, such as European values and external pressure. What does Hungarian ‘pragmatism’, or rather friendship towards Russia look like?
To achieve greater energy security, Hungary has signed a deal with Rosatom to build a new nuclear power plant, financed mainly by a Russian loan. Although the terms of the loan are said to be highly favourable, it would nevertheless make Hungary indebted for generations (Végh, 2015), besides the opportunities such project offers for corruption. The plans still have not been approved after 8 years due to failing to meet EU regulations, and details of the agreement are classified. If the power plant clearly benefits the nation, why all this secrecy? Less controversially, Hungary is an enthusiastic energy customer of Russia, opting for long-term contracts that can be used in election campaigns - iconic “Utility Cost Reduction!” (Fidesz, 2021).
Commenting on the EU’s sanctions towards Russia over Ukraine, the Hungarian prime minister declared that Europe is ‘shooting itself in the foot’ economically (Szakacs, 2014). The latest example of Hungarian national interest coincidentally aligning with the Russian one is being the first to approve the Sputnik covid vaccine before the review of the European Medicines Agency (Than and Komuves, 2021). The chances that ‘friendship’ was a more important deciding factor than scientific considerations is highly likely.
Hungarian pragmatism - declared to be business-oriented - is accompanied by irrational diplomatic rhetoric, directly and indirectly supporting Russia and criticising the EU at the same time (Rachman, 2014). The level of sympathy shown not only ridicules the notion of rational pragmatism; the opinion of the nation so dear to Fidesz, the overwhelming majority of whom are very attached to the EU (Eurobarometer, 2021); but also calls into question the nature of national interest - or Fidesz’ interest, rather. Irrational pragmatism could be the result of small Hungary balancing between Europe and alternative rising powers, but nevertheless the consequence is a clear lack of commitment to common causes outside, and even overlapping with national interest. Where does this leave the Visegrád Group?
Hungary’s Position in V4
As long as the foreign policy goals of the V4 remain untouched and cynical public statements between leaders avoided, the alliance will likely remain as insignificant as it is now. Arguably, there are more important coinciding interests than a common approach to Russia. For example, defying the EU on matters of migration (Stevis-Gridneff and Pronczuk, 2020), rule of law (Fleming et al, 2021), and enjoying the (limited) benefits of business exchange are good enough incentives to fulfil the conditions of relative agreement. If the situation gets so serious that unanimity is required, Hungary will quietly go along with the majority just like in 2014 when the sanctions were voted, still preserving the authoritarian sympathy forming the basis of many of Hungary’s relations and contributing to the general erosion of democracy in Europe (Holesch and Kyriazi, 2021).
Nevertheless, in order to become a more significant player in Europe and for Hungary to be a more decisive actor in the V4, a deeper level of trust is required - not just a temporary pact to irritate the EU - optimising the overlap in national interests and using tools other than symbolic deals and diplomatic outbursts. What this would entail in practice is firstly resisting the temptation to make undiplomatic remarks implying sympathy, even admiration for the Russian political system (Ambrosio, 2020). Secondly, respecting the historical experience of the other V4 members is a minimum for any community, not just on Polish-Hungarian Friendship day. Finally, sharing up to date knowledge of the differing Russian interference in the political, economic, and media spheres of the member states would provide a more informed perspective and evaluation of foreign policy goals (Smolenova et al, 2017). While a common foreign policy concept (within the broad EU framework) is still unlikely in the future, it would nevertheless strengthen the cooperation, and the approaches may even converge over time. After all, relying only on Russia may not be the best way to make a stand in the European Union, and if a crucial alliance like Visegrád is neglected, Hungary may fall between two stools if and when sides have to be chosen.
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Sergei Lavrov and Peter Szijjarto. Photo by: Peter Szijjarto, Facebook