FRIENDS, THOUGH NOT THE BEST ONES

The problems of historical memory in contemporary Russian-Iranian relations

Friends, though not the best ones: the problems of historical memory in contemporary Russian-Iranian: Text

Friends, though not the best ones: the problems of historical memory in contemporary Russian-Iranian: Image

October 2023

Since the onset of the military conflict in Ukraine in 2022, major global media outlets and think tanks have extensively covered the deepening cooperation between Russia and Iran across various domains, encompassing the military, economic, and political spheres (NBC News 2022; The Atlantic Council 2022; BBC News 2022; The Washington Post 2022; Foreign Policy 2023). This analysis is underpinned by Tehran's de facto support for Moscow in its confrontation with Kiev. Moreover, this collaborative trend cannot be separated from the broader context of the late 2010s and early 2020s, wherein Russia and Iran have fostered joint endeavors in regions like Syria and the South Caucasus, while simultaneously attempting to construct an alternative to the “Western-oriented world order” (at least, that is how they frame it). This partnership has extended to bolstered economic ties, exemplified by a 15% increase in trade between the two nations in 2022, reaching $4.6 billion (Интерфакс 2023). Although these figures may seem modest, they carry significance given the constraints imposed by international sanctions on both the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic.

At the same time, while some experts believe that Russia and Iran will continue to move closer together, there are serious contradictions between them (The Moscow Times 2023; Смагин 2023; Grajewski and Geranmayeh 2023). These include the relatively similar export structures of the two countries, the conflict of interests in energy markets, the diverse nature of the Kremlin’s policy in the Middle East (especially Moscow's relations with West Jerusalem), and the polarization of Iranian society over the vision of Russia. This article will specifically delve into one facet of the latter issue.

One of the famous Arab proverbs says: the Bedouin took revenge after forty years and said: “I hastened”. Although this proverb refers to a Bedouin, its narrative resonates with the broader Middle East. The matter is that historical memory still has a particular significance for the region. The examples of this are especially visible in the way different segments of Iranian society and political elites perceive Russia. As it always happens, this perception constitutes a mix of real historical events, myths and conspiracy theories. This way, in Iranian social and news media, one can come across references to the so-called “Peter the Great's Will”. In it, the first Russian emperor said the following: “Russia needs to get close to Istanbul, India, and Iran, and needs to start a war with these governments to get to the Persian Gulf as soon as possible”(پسندیده 2016). In this regard, some Iranian bloggers, specializing in historical content, draw parallels between this historical notion and contemporary leadership, suggesting that in the modern era, Vladimir Putin fulfills the role envisioned by Peter the Great (iranianuk.com 2022).

However, key to understanding how Iranian society interprets Russia is its historical memory of the 19th and 20th centuries. During this era, Persia faced a profound statehood crisis, which manifested in challenges related to economic and military development. Concurrently, the South Caucasus and the Middle East were arenas of territorial expansion for major global powers, including Russia. Consequently, Iran found itself in a series of conflicts and was compelled to sign treaties that ceded some of its previously held territories, such as parts of present-day Armenia and Azerbaijan, to Russia.

One contentious point in Russian-Iranian relations centers around the Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1828, an agreement that Iranian society views as deeply unfair. As a dramatic outcome of this accord, шт in 1829 the Russian embassy in Iran was stormed by an enraged crowd, resulting in the death of almost all diplomats, including the ambassador Aleksander Griboyedov because he was considered one of key figures in the conclusion of this treaty. Nowadays, the diplomat is associated with colonialism in the Islamic Republic. In Russia, however, he has a completely different reputation, first of all as one of the most famous writers. In this regard, it remains a tradition for the staff of the Russian mission in Iran to annually lay flowers at Griboyedov’s monument within the embassy’s grounds. But in 2022 this seemingly routine gesture triggered an unexpectedly strong reaction from Iranian society. The newspaper “Hamshahri”, associated with the reformist block of the local political elite, ran a headline that read: “Russian Ambassador insults Iranian people once again. Is the Iranian Foreign Ministry taking action?” (Hamshahrionline 2022). This publication sparked widespread outrage in Iran and even led to clashes on social media platforms between the Russian Embassy and local media outlets. The question raised by some Iranian journalists concerned the appropriateness of Tehran’s rapprochement with Moscow. The general logic of such a judgment was: if Russia does not respect Iran’s past, how can it respect the Islamic Republic’s interests? Here, it should be added that “reformists” traditionally have a skeptical attitude towards the Kremlin, giving a preference to improving relations with the EU countries (یورونیوز 2018). That is why they exploit anti-Russian sentiment in Iranian society more often than, say, conservatives.

The second complex chapter in Russian-Iranian relations is intertwined with events in the first half of the twentieth century. The first instance transpired in the early 1900s when Iran was partitioned into spheres of influence, with the Russian Empire and the United Kingdom each asserting their interests. This arrangement persisted until 1918. A parallel occurrence transpired during the Second World War when Iran was occupied by both the USSR and the UK. Moreover, until the mid-1940s, the Soviet Union supported separatist sentiments in the northern, minority-populated region of Iran.

These historical events continue to play a pivotal role in shaping Iranians’ perceptions of Russia. This influence became evident in the events of August 2021 when a photograph was taken of the Russian and UK ambassadors on the iconic staircase where the Tehran Conference of 1943 had occurred. This seemingly innocuous act stirred significant controversy throughout Iranian society. Iran’s then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif, affiliated with the reformist faction, criticized the foreign diplomats involved, drawing stark parallels with the country’s wartime occupation (IRNA 2021). Notably, even conservative politicians, including Mohammad Qalibaf, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, weighed in with strong objections to the actions of the Russian and British diplomats (Irna 2021), despite Qalibaf's reputation as a pro-Russian figure (BBC News فارسی 2021).

In this way, it is possible to say that two occupations of Iran in the first half of the 20th century left a profound and lasting impact on Iranian society. This influence extends beyond a mere cautious stance toward Russia and the UK; it has given rise to a deep-seated aversion to foreign personnel, particularly military forces, operating within the Islamic Republic’s borders. This historical pattern became acutely apparent in 2016 when Moscow and Tehran explored the possibility of utilizing an Iranian airfield as a transit point for Russian aircraft involved in military operations in Syria. Despite this arrangement being the result of high-level negotiations between senior Iranian and Russian officials, it triggered widespread protests across the country when it became public knowledge.

Demonstrators took to the streets, vehemently expressing their unwillingness to tolerate the presence of foreign troops on Iranian soil, drawing parallels to past occupations. Consequently, Tehran had no choice but to retract its earlier agreement with Moscow, despite its potential benefits for both parties (Кожанов 2016; Смагин 2019).

The cases presented here clearly demonstrate a deep distrust of Russia in Iranian society, based on history. These attitudes are used by some elite groups in the political establishment of the Islamic Republic. Besides the examples which have been outlined above, Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Moscow at the beginning of 2022 is also worths attention. Commenting on this event, local daily Arman Meli writes that the basic principle of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, according to which it must balance between East and West, has been violated and Raisi’s visit to Russia is an apogee of this process (Pishkan 2022). Ayatollah Hossein Musavi Tabrizi, a religious and political figure, echoed this skepticism, noting that: “Most domestic experts are skeptical about the deal with Russia and relations with that country, believing that Russia thinks primarily about its national interests and may behave in a way that is not in Iran's national interest” (Ibid). As the previous critics of Iranian rapprochement with Russia, this media outlet and the quoted politician belong to a group of so-called “reformists”. However, even within the populist segment of the Islamic Republic's political landscape, there are voices of dissent. This way, ex-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad compares the behavior of current leadership with Kadjar dynasty who “wanted to sell the country” (خبرآنلاین 2022).

This way, it is possible to conclude that despite the increasing economic and military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, there is no uniform sentiment within Iranian society towards Russia. Furthemore, a negative perception of bilateral relations in a historical perspective by the population of the Islamic Republic provides a strong basis for bad attitudes towards Moscow at present. In this respect, while “reformist” and populist political factions have historically exhibited skepticism and sometimes exploited anti-Russian sentiments among the Iranian population, pro-Russian segments, especially conservatives, have sometimes had to reluctantly align themselves with these sentiments. At the same time, it would be an oversimplification to label Iran as an entirely anti-Russian country. Despite a complex relationship in the past, contemporary realities force Tehran to be pragmatic in choosing its foreign policy partners. Both Iran and Russia face substantial sanctions from Western countries, making rapprochement nearly inevitable. Though occasional historical memory-related incidents, such as Iran’s refusal to provide a site for Russian aircraft, can strain individual initiatives, they are unlikely to alter the broader trend of deepening bilateral relations.

However, it is essential to recognize that nothing is set in stone. In a hypothetical scenario where the Iranian regime becomes more democratic, historical memory could play a more significant role in shaping Tehran’s policy towards Moscow. Nevertheless, while democratization in the Islamic Republic is not impossible, it remains unlikely. A more realistic, albeit currently uncertain (especially in the context of the crisis in Gaza) prospect is the partial normalization of Iran’s relations with Western countries. With greater international flexibility, Tehran may be more inclined to engage with or exploit historical memory issues in its relations with Russia. In such circumstances, the idea of a solid alliance between the two nations becomes increasingly challenging to envision.

By Maximillian Savinykh

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