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BRIDGES TO THE EAST, GAPS IN THE WEST ?

Analysing the extent to which the ‘warming’ of Russian-Saudi relations reflect growing problems in US-Saudi affairs

Bridges to the East, Gaps in the West ? Analysing the extent to which the ‘warming’ of Russian-Saudi: Text
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Bridges to the East, Gaps in the West ? Analysing the extent to which the ‘warming’ of Russian-Saudi: Image

In recent years, observers have perceived a “warming” in the Kremlin’s relations with Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Weiss & Alexander-Greene 2022). Considering Saudi’s long-term ties with the US, to what extent does this reflect growing problems in Washington's long-term ties with Riyadh ?


According to the US Department of State, Washington and Riyadh have maintained a “strategic partnership” for more than 80 years (US Department of State 2022). In a strategic partnership states cooperate, not only because their security interests align, but also due to common economic, trade and technological concerns (Kumar 2022). Despite differences, such as Saudi Arabia’s monarchical regime, religious conservatism and violation of human rights, the two countries have maintained bilateral relations particularly when it comes to energy and security (CFR 2018). The US has relied on Saudi Arabia for oil supplies, perceiving it as a significant partner in the Middle East. An unsurprising fact, considering that out of the 10.7 million barrels of oil Saudi Arabia produces, 7.43 million are exported (CFR 2018). One of the factors damaging US-Saudi ties was the increase in US oil production between 2009 and 2019, which resulted in the US obtaining the ‘title’ of the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas (Ulrichsen, Finley & Krane 2022).    


The Syrian conflict in 2015 actively enhanced Moscow’s engagement in the Middle East (Rumer & Weiss 2019), at around the same time Riyadh sought to diversify its partnerships and cultivate new economic and political ties (Mammadov 2019). Therefore, by compartmentalising their relation and putting aside geopolitical differences over Iran and Syria (ibid.), since 2016 Moscow and Riyadh appear to be seeing ‘eye to eye’ when it comes to their decisions on managing the global oil markets. The two countries are referred to as “oil superpowers” (Brady, Bahree & Burkhard 2019), therefore their settlements are instrumental in balancing oil prices and ensuring their economic security. The energy ties of the two countries became institutionalised in the end of 2016 when Russia joined the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) (Laron 2023). The two countries sought to stabilise the market - Riyadh in order to prevent the US from emerging as a strong competitor in the worldwide market (CFR 2018) and Moscow to avoid the impact of US sanctions, that sought to isolate it from the global economy after its annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Mammadov 2019; Ulrichsen, Finley & Krane 2022). As such, the two countries alongside other OPEC members, collectively reduced their oil production (CFR 2018) which resulted in the surge of oil prices (Ulrichsen, Finley & Krane 2022). 


In a similar manner, following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, unprecedented political and economic sanctions were imposed on Russia which also attempted to segregate Russia from the West (Cheterian 2023: 12), therefore, Moscow attempted to find new alliances in the East and “new export markets” (Avdaliani 2023). In a similar vein, it immediately became evident that Saudi Arabia was also willing to leverage the on-going situation. Following the war, Saudi’s investment firm ‘Kingdom Holding Company’ invested over USD 500 million in three of Russia’s largest energy companies - Gazprom, Rosneft and Lukoil (Abdallah & Al Sayegh 2022). In April 2022, Saudi Arabia significantly increased its imports of Russian refined fuel oil, which it could then sell to other countries at a higher price point (Krauss 2022). As a result, Russian fuel oil to Saudi Arabia reached 76,000 barrels per day (ibid.). Adding to the previous points, the two countries aim to increase their bilateral trade to USD 5 billion by 2030 (Middle East Briefing 2023).


The warming of Russian-Saudi relations, reflects a shifting global order where countries like Saudi Arabia are increasingly willing to engage with multiple major powers. While it may raise concerns in Washington and prompt a reevaluation of U.S.- Saudi relations, it is essential to recognise that these dynamics are driven by a combination of economic, geopolitical, and security factors. Saudi Arabia's actions can be seen as part of a broader strategy to secure its interests and maintain its role as a key player in the Middle East. It is important to note that the global geopolitical landscape constantly evolves, meaning that Riyadh is attempting to diversify its strategic relationships. However, this does not necessarily imply a complete rupture in US-Saudi relations, especially considering that commercial considerations are key in leading the ties between Moscow and Riyadh, rather than a ‘deeper, formal’ alliance. 




Bibliography


Abdallah, N. and Sayegh, H. (2022) Saudi prince made $500 million Russia bet at start of Ukraine War, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-arabias-kingdom-holding-invests-russian-energy-companies-2022-08-14/ 


Avdaliani, E. (2023) Russia and Saudi Arabia: The 2023 –24 trade and Investment Dynamics, Russia Briefing News. Available at: https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-and-saudi-arabia-the-2023-24-trade-and-investment-dynamics.html/#:~:text=An%20example%20of%20a%20Saudi,decreased%20to%20US%241.6%20billion. 


Bezat, J.-M. (2023) ‘no longer subservient to the US, Saudi Arabia is now looking to China and Russia’, Le Monde.fr. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/09/25/no-longer-subservient-to-the-us-saudi-arabia-is-now-looking-to-china-and-russia_6139606_23.html 

CFR (2018) U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations, Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-saudi-arabia-relations 


Cheterian, V. (2023) ‘Friend and foe: Russia–Turkey relations before and after the war in Ukraine’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, pp. 1–24.


Krauss, C. (2022) Ostracized by the West, Russia finds a partner in Saudi Arabia, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/14/business/energy-environment/russia-saudi-oil-putin-mbs.html (Accessed: 03 November 2023). 


Kumar, R. (2022) Renu Gaur asked: IR theorists differentiate between ‘alliance’ and ‘strategic partnership’. what is the difference and which one characterises the quad?, Renu Gaur asked: IR theorists differentiate between ‘alliance’ and ‘strategic partnership’. What is the difference and which one characterises the QUAD? | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Available at: https://www.idsa.in/askanexpert/IR-theorists-differentiate-between-alliance-and-strategic-partners 


Laron, G. (2023) The OPEC+ Puzzle: Why Russian-Saudi cooperation starts - and stops - with oil prices, Wilson Center. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/opec-puzzle-why-russian-saudi-cooperation-starts-and-stops-oil-prices 


Mammadov, R. (2019) Growing ties with Russia could strain Saudi-US relations, Middle East Institute. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/growing-ties-russia-could-strain-saudi-us-relations 

Middle East Briefing (2023) Saudi-Russia bilateral trade targeted at US$5 billion, Middle East Briefing. Available at: https://www.middleeastbriefing.com/news/saudi-russia-bilateral-trade-targeted-at-us5-billion/ 


Ulrichsen, K.O., Finley , M. and Krane, J. (2022) The OPEC+ phenomenon of Saudi-Russian cooperation and implications for US-saudi relationsK, Baker Institute. Available at: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/opec-phenomenon-saudi-russian-cooperation-and-implications-us-saudi-relations

US Department of State (2022) U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia - United States Department of State, U.S. Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-saudi-arabia/ 


Weiss, A.S. and Alexander-Greene, J. (2022) What’s driving Russia’s opportunistic inroads with Saudi Arabia and the ..., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/05/what-s-driving-russia-s-opportunistic-inroads-with-saudi-arabia-and-gulf-arabs-pub-88099 


Image:  King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia and President Vladimir Putin / Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55775 

Bridges to the East, Gaps in the West ? Analysing the extent to which the ‘warming’ of Russian-Saudi: Text
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