A SECURE PARTNERSHIP?
ASSESSING WHY INDIA STILL VIEWS RUSSIA AS A VALUABLE STRATEGIC PARTNER
By Louis Rawlinson
When Dr Kissinger wrote of Indian strategic non-alignment in his book World Order, the infamous realist motioned to Indian culture, history, and spirituality. He wrote of hindu political thought as being ‘both an exhortation to war and the importance not so much of avoiding but of transcending it.’ (Kissinger, 2014). As Europe sets its gaze on the frosty battlefields, dark trenches and concrete fortresses of Ukraine, this widely condemned war is understood differently to political strategists in New Delhi. Although the grizzly scenes of attritional warfare continue to disturb those observering from a distance, Russia’s war has been understood as a strategic opportunity to those in power in India. Much to the frustration of the international community and the West, India’s support for Russia has shed light on the true meaning of her stance as a non-aligned power. Is this owing to a historic feeling of obligation, or is it simply a case of political cunning?
The stark difference of approach towards Russia can be understood on the most symbolic level. To many in the West the snow capped domes of the Kremlin represent a gloomy bastion of authoritarianism unrivalled by the rest of the world. To India, the Kremlin is a fortress that is crucial to providing arms and energy to the subcontinent. On August 9th 1971, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko scratched his signature on the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. He and his Indian counterpart Swaran Singh kickstarted an era of bilateral trade and partnership. This partnership has been tested at times, but when Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022, India did not join with her various non-aligned partners in condemning this epic assault on international law. Instead it chose to abstain from the vote on the Security Council (Economist, 2022).
India has asserted that it wishes to seek an end to the war, and has provided over 7,000 kg of humanitarian aid to Ukraine according to the Hindustan times (The Hindustan times, 2022), making clear that it does not officially support this war. However, co-operation over military and technological matters has remained strong, as Article VI of the Indo-Soviet treaty outlines. According to the scholar S.P. Singh, article VI of the treaty promotes ‘the expansion of mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in economic, scientific and technological fields on the basis of most-favoured nation treatment.’ (Singh, 1979). With Russian help, prime minister Modi’s new “Make in India programme” has ploughed ahead full steam. In 2021, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu signed a contract agreeing to the procurement of over six million AK-203 assault rifles (The Economic Times, 2021). Though the world has transformed since the dark days of the Cold War, and as prime minister Nardendra Modi proclaims Indian non-alignment, the ink on this historic friendship has long dried, yet the partnership remains strong.
In recent years, ties between India and Russia have appeared to run deep. This is made strikingly clear by the arms trade between India and Russia, with over 60 per cent of India’s military hardware being Russian produced (Kaushik, 2024). Joint arms trade between the two countries has in fact extended to the remit of both land and air, with India purchasing tanks from Russia, such as the formidable T-90 (Kaushik, 2024). According to a report by the Economist magazine, it is Russia’s ‘best active tank’ (The Economist, 2022), fitted with the latest armaments and defence software. Such a vehicle could only be sold to an entrusted and valued client.
Given this strong relationship over defence, it would appear to many that India cannot afford to decouple from Russia. However according to Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spokesman Javier Shergill, there is a logic to India’s non-alignment strategy in today’s multipolar world. He articulated his nation’s current role “India has become an agenda setter” (Der Welt, 2024). He also shared his opinion on the current state of geopolitics “I think that the era of one single power domination is gone”. When we pause to reflect on the worldview of Indian officials like Shergill, diplomacy is not limited to either the Western or Eastern nations, but encompasses both. Though this can be testing for the Western rules-based order, for Russia it is certainly a plus.
India’s purchase of the Russian made missile air defence system, the S-400 (Der Welt, 2023), constituted a monumental affirmation of India’s commitment to her partnership with Russia. New Delhi risked an array of Western sanctions for this transaction (Der Welt, 2023) . Signs of the diversification of India’s military arsenal pont to an increased uncertainty of New Delhi’s faith in a partnersihip hinged upon defence. But it is clear that Indian collaboration with Russia over nuclear and military technologies show the relationship is still alive. India has been unable to hide its interest in acquiring Western produced defence technologies. With India’s old foe China acquiring some of the same Russian armaments and defence systems (Economist, 2022) it seems sensical for India to branch out and consider alternative arms suppliers. However India cannot abandon Russia as an ally, she must carefully display a forthright commitment to Russia. For India, it will require time and patience to diversify her relations with other security partners. It is the threat of an ascendant China which implores India to maintain the intimate understanding she and Russia have traditionally shared since 1971.
The China question
If we set our gaze upon the serene views of Aksai chin, we would see a land where ice cloaks the mountain peaks, and roads cut across a land brushed orange. This is a terrain that officials in New Delhi believe is lawfully India’s. Yet the Bengal tiger has been standing en garde for some time, awaiting the dragon’s next move from behind the mountaintops. Though this may seem a sensationalized portrait of the India-China border dispute, to both nations the anger they share is just as visceral. An increasingly rampant China has already tested current relations between Beijing and New Delhi. A recent border clash in 2020 has revived this frozen conflict. It is in this particular arena where Russia goes from playing the role of an aggressor, as we have seen in Europe, to acting the part of the peacemaker. For example, China has flexed its muscle in the past by opposing loans to India through the Asian Development Bank (Biswas, 2022). On the other hand, an Asian framework that is inclusive of Russia could see China face increasing challenges over such belligerent action in the future.
While Russia turns to Asia for its future survival in the international arena, at the same time that India consolidates its position as the captain of the Global South, it only seems sensible for New Delhi to keep Russia on side. Spokesman Javier Shergill seemed cautionary towards China, revealing his country’s position, and describing Chinese grand strategy as being of “complete ambiguity” (Der Welt, 2024). This partly explains why economic ties between Russia and India have strengthened since the beginning of the Ukraine war, with Indian imports from Russia even quadrupling (France 24 English, 2023). Whilst we have witnessed the diplomatic-love affair between Moscow and Beijing prosper, Russia is finding itself in a position where it will need to reciprocate should it wish to maintain such a strong partnership with India in the future. In a great power contest against China over the aksai chin border, Russia may prove to be the ally India requires for greater political leverage over this dispute. In the shadow of a mighty China, Russia appears a lame dog, but her partnership with New Delhi may force Russia to reconsider her relationship with China. The Indo-Russian partnership provides that key alternative for Russia to oppose unchecked Chinese expansionism.
